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Abstract 
Several factors have often been noted to explain the poor performance 
of the CEMAC economies. In addition to the traditional factors of economic 
growth, institutional variables are crucial in explaining the growth of 
countries. This paper aimed at investigating the relationship between 
institutional quality and economic growth using neo-institutional theory and 
neoclassical theory of growth. First difference and system Generalized 
Method of Moments are applied on the six countries of the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community for the period of 1996 to 2014. All the 
coefficients of the institutional variables are positive except for the quality of 
regulation and control of corruption. There is a positive and significant 
relationship between political stability and economic growth in CEMAC zone. 
This study recommends that political stability should be reinforced for an 
increase in the economic growth of the CEMAC zone.
Keywords: Institutional quality, political stability, economic growth, 
Generalized Method of Moment 
 
Introduction 
Institutions are a set of constraints imagined by citizens to determine 
their interactions, structure possibilities and ensure human exchanges. It 
structure incentives in human exchanges in the economic, political and social 
spheres (North, 1990). In this perspective, institutions are designed to ensure 
respect by the individual and the state for collective rules. Therefore 
institutions can either slow down or accelerate economic growth. Hence, the 
quality of institutions is very essential for production. It also determines the 
firm's ability to accumulate and use factors of production and ensures the 
optimal management of resources and the efficient and effective operation of 
economic activities.     
Good institutions lead to returns to scale because they reduce 
uncertainty through coordination and control of initial costs. Indeed, they 
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secure property rights (North & Weingast, 1989; North, 1990), reduce 
transaction costs (North, 1990; Javaid & Iftikhar, 2011), uncertainty (North, 
1990), and the volatility of the economic environment (Klomp & Haan, 2009; 
Rodrik, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001). 
CEMAC16 is one of the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa that have not 
experienced rapid economic growth in the last two decades. Indeed, its average 
gross domestic product per capita is less than 5 % over the period from 1996 
to 2014. This weak growth is due to the low diversification of the productive 
base and exports of its economies, oil price shocks, weak inter-regional trade, 
poor quality of institutions and political instability (Abessolo, 2004; 
Mercereau & Ghura, 2004; Kamgna, 2014; Diaw & Lessoua, 2013; WGI , 
2015, Besso & Pamen, 2016). 
Countries of the CEMAC zone have experienced periods of political 
instability. These are five coups d' Etat (1966, 1979, 1981, 2003 and 2013) and 
an attempted coup d' Etat  (2001) in Central African Republic (CAR), five 
coups d' Etat (1968, 1970, 1977, 1979, 1997) and two attempted coups d' Etat 
(1966, 1972) in Congo, four coups d' Etat (1975, 1979, 1982, 1990) and two 
attempted coup d' Etat (2004, 2006) in Chad, a coup d' Etat (1979) and an 
attempted coup d' Etat (2004) in Equatorial Guinea, a coup d' Etat (1964) and 
an attempted coup d' Etat (2019) in Gabon and an attempted coup d' Etat 
(1984) in Cameroon. Furthermore in Cameroon, for example, a protracted 
protestation of post-independence political history from April to October 1991 
paralyzed economic activities in the regions of this country with the exception 
of those of the South, East and Centre. In addition, major unrest has also 
marked the period of democratic transition following the death of President 
Omar Bongo Ondimba in 2009 and the re-election of President Ali Bongo in 
2016 in Gabon. Also, since 2013, the political context in the CEMAC zone 
has been marked by serious regional, political and security crises in the Central 
African Republic on one hand and kidnappings and terrorist attacks in the 
northern part of Cameroon linked to incursions of extremist groups claiming 
Islamist Boko Haram sect of Nigeria since 2014, on other hand. 
Indeed, the CEMAC zone is one of the least rated areas by governance 
agencies such as Freedom House, Polity IV, Fraser Institute, Heritage 
Foundation, International Country Risk Guide, Freedom House and the World 
Bank. Actually, according to the World Bank Governance Institute (WGI, 
2015), over the period from 1996 to 2014, all the averages of the indicators 
are negative for all countries in the CEMAC zone. In fact, scored on a scale of 
-2.5 to 2.5, ie -2.5 representing institutions of worst quality and 2.5 institutions 
of better quality, indicators of voice and accountability and Rule of law are the 
                                                        
16 CEMAC (Communauté économique et monétaire des États d’Afrique centrale) or Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community is composed of Cameroon, Congo, Central 
African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad. 
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worst and are worth -1.16 each. That of government effectiveness is -1.14, 
while the indicator of control of corruption is -1.04, that of quality of 
regulation is -0.99, and that of political stability is -0 75. 
However, in 1990s, the wind of democracy blowing in African 
countries following the collapse of the communist bloc also affects the 
CEMAC countries; freedom of expression, political and associative pluralism 
are proclaimed by the political authorities. Although, merely three decades 
after this majorly change, progress in governance still seems slow in the 
CEMAC countries, which subsequently may undermine the economic growth 
of this zone (World Bank 2002; IMF 2003; Yildirim & Gökalp 2016).   
According to Rodrik (1991), Alesina and Perotti (1994), political 
instability creates uncertainty, threatens property rights and encourages 
unproductive activities such as rent seeking, corruption, and discourages 
investment. Indeed, in periods of political instability, property rights 
protection mechanisms are becoming more fragile and businessmen are more 
inclined to reduce or reorient their investments in order to avoid risks. 
Campos and Karanasos (2008) distinguish two forms of political 
instability, namely: the formal grouping, the number of legislative elections, 
the number of major constitutional changes, government crises. Second, the 
informal political instability manifested in non-constitutional political 
upheavals and social tensions between civil society and political power. In 
turn, Alesina et al. (1996), Siermann (1998), Fosu (2001) and Miljkovic and 
Rimal (2008) consider a change of government as a sign of political instability. 
They later define political instability as any change in executive power 
through legal (constitutional) forms or politically motivated (unconstitutional) 
violence. It is clear in their definition that normal institutional changes are 
considered as political instability and they also contribute to the smooth 
functioning of political institutions. On the other hand, other studies such as 
those of Alesina and Perotti (1996), Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Blanco 
and Grier (2000) consider social unrest as political instability. As a result, their 
measure of political instability focused on society's response to government. 
The results of studies of political instability on economic growth are 
mixed. Many of the studies that attempt to link political instability with 
economic growth have an inverse relationship (Alesina et al., 1996; Easterly 
& Levine (1997; Barro, 1996; Azam, Berthelemy & Calipel, 1996; Younis, 
Xiao Lin, Sharahili, & Selvarathinam, 2008; Radu, 2015). However, another 
set of authors finds a weak link between political instability and economic 
growth (Londregan & Poole, 1990; Levine & Renelt, 1992). 
Collier (1999) finds that, on average, a civil war usually causes a 
country to lose more than 2 % per year of its GDP per capita compared to what 
it would have achieved without the war. For the World Bank (2001), political 
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instability is one of the internal factors that explains the decline in economic 
growth on African countries since the early 1970s.  
Two important studies have been done on the impact of political 
instability and economic performance in Chad and the Central African 
Republic (Abessolo, 2004; Ghura & Mercereau, 2004). These shows that the 
poor performances recorded in Chad and CAR result from a particularly 
unstable political and social environment. Nasreen, Anwar and Waqar (2015) 
analyzed the long-term impact of institutions on investment and economic 
growth in the context of neoclassical model for the period 1985 to 2010 on 94 
countries. They used cross-country and panel data techniques and their 
empirical results indicated that both physical and human capital investment 
have positive impact on economic growth. Economic freedom had a direct 
impact on economic growth by enhancing factor productivity and indirect by 
increasing investment. Political and civil liberties also exerted positive impact 
on investment.  If we find these studies interesting, they focused on the aspect 
of the quality of institutions or on data coming from Freedom House reports. 
Their results do not provide enough information on the state of the problem in 
the CEMAC zone. The current paper, plans to cover the gaps in literature by 
studying the impact of institutional quality on economic growth in the context 
of neoclassical model using all the institutional variables proposed by the 
World Bank and on the six CEMAC countries. If we use World Governance 
indicators (2015) and the methodology follows by Nasreen et al. (2015) do the 
results differ from those obtained in (Abessolo, 2004; Ghura & Mercereau, 
2004)’s studies? 
Thus, the main objective of this paper is to assess the effect of the 
quality of institutions in understanding growth in the CEMAC zone. This 
general objective is breaking into two specific objectives. While the first sub 
objective is to integrate the neo-institutional theory in the neo-classical theory, 
the second sub objective is to evaluate the role of the quality of institutions in 
the growth of the economies of the CEMAC zone. 
Two main schools of thought are interested in empirical works on 
economic growth since 1950’s. The first is that of neo-classical growth under 
the leadership of Solow (1956). The second is that of new growth theories 
under the direction of Romer (1986); Lucas (1988); Barro, (1989); Romer 
(1990); Rebelo (1991). After the deficiencies of the exogenous growth model 
in the explanation of steady-state economic growth at equilibrium due to his 
inability to explain growth with internal factors, authors like [Romer (1986); 
Lucas (1988); Barro, (1989); Romer (1990); Aghion & Howitt (1992)] are 
interested in a new generation of models termed "endogenous growth models" 
to explain economic growth through proxy factors such as the accumulation 
of human capital, physical capital and productivity, research and development 
or public spending. It is in this movement that some economists have looked 
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at other variables such as institutional measures among which are political 
instability (Barro, 1991; Ghura & Mercereau, 2004), civil liberties and 
political rights ( Knack & Keefer 1995; Scully (1989) and control of 
corruption (Mauro 1995; Del Monte & Papagni 2001). 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Islam (1995) enriched the 
neoclassical growth model by integrating human capital. Unlike Mankiw et al. 
(1992) who use cross-sectional data, Islam (1995) uses panel data. Mankiw et 
al., (1992) and Islam (1995) do not value technology in their work. This is part 
of the error term in their analyses. Nevertheless, they consider that the initial 
technology can be represented by resource endowments, climate, economic 
policies or the quality of institutions that may differ from one country to 
another. Mankiw et al. (1992) also hope that differences in tax, education, 
children's tastes and political stability are among the ultimate determinants of 
the difference in income between countries. In Mankiw et al. (1992), the term 
A represents technology or other variables such as resource endowments, 
climate and institutions, and other factors that may affect factor productivity. 
Since the quality of institutions affects productivity, the present work assumes 
that term A depends on the quality of institutions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 1 presents the 
literature review; data and model specification appear in section 2; section 3 
presents the estimation technique, section 4 discusses estimation results; 
conclusion and policy implications of the study appear in section 5. 
 
1. Literature Review 
After a decade of 1980 considered as a "lost decade" for most 
economies, the early 1990s for economists was a time of hope for economies 
around the world. At the same time, reforms following the Washington 
consensus led not only to poverty reduction, rapid growth, but also social 
progress in Latin America and East Asia. By contrast, sub-Saharan Africa has 
not experienced the same change (World Bank 2005; Rodrik 1999). To reduce 
poverty and obtain rapid growth in sub-Saharan Africa, large sums have been 
allocated to African countries through official development assistance and 
reforms initiated. But poverty still reigns in Africa, and the gap between rich 
and poor countries continues to widen. However, Rodrik (1999; 2003) and 
World Bank (2005) draw attention to the need for catching up in other parts 
of the world. Knack and Keefer (1995) argue that the reforms undertaken in 
the 1990s have not produced good results because of an unfavourable 
institutional environment characterized by insecure property rights and low 
level of rule of law. According to Rodrik (1996), the difficulties encountered 
in implementing these reforms are the cause of the backwardness of countries 
that have not experienced a take-off after these reforms. This author shows 
that, beyond external shocks, latent social conflicts, conflict management 
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institutions are responsible for the failures of the reforms initiated as a result 
of the Washington Consensus. 
In the absence of an appropriate institutional framework where the rule 
of law prevails, political stability, property rights are well executed, and 
corruption is under control, infrastructure development projects, public and 
private investment cannot function well in Third World countries (Easterly, 
2001). Although several works (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; 2002; 
Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004) have dwelt on the importance of 
institutions in explaining economic growth, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes & Shleifer (2004) criticized its relevance and showed that human 
capital was the most robust determinant. They latter reviewed the debate on 
the impact of political institutions on growth on one hand, and the impact of 
economic growth and human capital accumulation on institutional 
development on the other hand. For these authors, poor countries will have to 
put better policies in place and improve their political institutions afterwards.  
Fabro and Aixalá (2009) studied the link between economic growth 
and quality of institutions by applying the generalized system moments 
method, the double and triple least squares in a sample of 145 countries. They 
find out that the direct impact of the quality of institutions on the per capita 
GDP of countries is a function of the level of development of the country 
concerned. For these authors, this impact is positive but not significant for 
countries with very low per capita income, and is more positive and significant 
for middle-income countries than for rich countries. 
Dawson (1998) specified his models as a multiple regression model on 
one hand, and as a panel data model on the other hand. He added institutions 
to the traditional factors of the neoclassical model. From a sample of 85 
countries and from 1975 to 1990, the author finds that the introduction of 
economic freedom as a factor in the Mankiw et al. (1992) increases R2 from 
0.29 to 0.47. His results show that economic freedom has a significant and 
positive impact on economic growth. But, the author finds that civil and 
political freedoms do not have a significant impact on economic growth. 
Kilishi, Mobalaji, Yaru and Yakubu (2013) studied the impact of 
institutions on the poor economic performance of 36 countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa over the period 1996 to 2010. The authors use the 6 governance 
indicators of the World Bank: voice and accountability, political stability, 
quality of regulation, rule of law and control of corruption and aggregate 
indicator of the 6 indicators above, and interaction effects between variables 
representing the quality of institutions and the commercial opening. They 
specify a Solow model enriched to institutions in the form of a dynamic panel 
model. The authors find that the coefficients of investment in physical and 
human capital are positive and significant. The coefficient of the growth rate 
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of the population is significant and negative. Of the six governance indicators, 
only the coefficients of regulation quality and the rule of law were significant. 
In turn, Avom and Song (2014) examined the effects of institutions 
and human capital on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa during the 
period 2000-2010. The authors use a fixed-effects panel data model in which 
they adopt Rodrik's (2005) classification approach for economic institutions 
by distinguishing market-creating institutions, market stabilization 
institutions, regulators market and market legitimation institutions. Using the 
variables of Polity IV, Economic Freedom and World Development 
Indicators, the authors found that market creation, regulatory stabilization and 
human capital institutions stimulate economic growth for the sample in 
question. On the other hand, legitimating institutions deteriorate economic 
growth. 
In their works, Abessolo (2004) and Ghura and Mercereau (2004) 
showed that the poor performances recorded by Chad and the CAR 
respectively result from a particularly unstable political and social 
environment. In the same vein, Fondo and Teke (1992) showed that improving 
governance will lead to stronger economic growth in Cameroon. 
 
2. Model specification and data 
The model used in this study is an augmented neoclassical model 
(Solow, 1956) inspired by the empirical studies of [Mankiw et al., (1992); 
Dawson (1998); Islam (1995)]. It is a Cobb-Douglas equation with Harrod-
neutral technical progress and decreasing efficiency. Where α and β are the 
elasticities of production in relation to physical and human capital, 
respectively. Y is the level of production, K and H are the physical and human 
capital respectively. L is labour force and A is the level of technology. (1-α-β) 
is the income elasticity per effective work unit. Assuming that labour force 
has an exogenous growth rate, n, the exogenous technical progress increases 
at the rate g, in such a way that ( ) (0) ntL t L e  and ( ) (0) gtA t A e .  Physical 
and human capital depreciate at the same rate δ. kS and hS  are proportions of 
income invested in physical and human capital respectively. n represent active 
population, q  institutional quality. The income equation for CEMAC 
countries is:  
 
Equation (1) above can be written as follows: 
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This study employs panel data analysis because our objective is to estimate 
long term relationship between institutional quality and economic growth. 
Moreover, panel data can control country specific effects and also assume 
different production functions for different countries while cross-section data 
assume same production function for all countries. For panel data analysis, 
equation to be estimated can be written in the following form: 
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yi,t is  ln of GDP per capita in countries i at time t, yi,t-1 is  lagged variable of 
GDP per capita. q refers to institutional quality that is approximated by control 
of corruption, rule of law, voice and accountability, quality of regulation, 
government effectiveness and rule of law. The data used in this study (see 
table 1 in appendix) are annual data from 1996 to 2014, covering the six 
countries in the CEMAC zone: Cameroon, Congo, Central African Republic, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad. The choice of annual data in this work is 
largely motivated by the independent variable of interest: the quality of 
institutions whose data comes from the World Bank Governance Institute 
(2015). Apparently, the average data are better when looking at the long-term 
link between economic growth and the quality of institutions. Nevertheless, 
the generalized moment’s method produces relatively interesting results for a 
panel of several countries and few years (Roodman, 2009). Studies of 
generalized moment’s method in system invariably use average data while 
ensuring that the number of countries is greater than the number of years. In 
the case of this work, the number N = 6 countries is less than the number of 
years 19, and the quality of the results could be reduced. It is necessary to carry 
out an analysis for the case of the countries of the CEMAC zone which are of 
low institutional quality. The data used in this work are secondary data and 
comes from two sources namely: World Development Indicators (2015) and 
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World Governance Indicators (2015). Economic growth is measured in terms 
of GDP per capita. '
itX  is a vector of control variables; Physical capital is 
measured by gross fixed capital formation. Human capital is measured by the 
number of students enrolled in secondary education. The labor force is 
measured by the rate of growth of the population, n. Like Mankiw et al. (1992), 
we assumed that n + g = 0.05.  
We use World Bank governance indicators. However, since the data 
were bi-annual from 1996 to 2002, we applied linear interpolation for the years 
1997, 1999 and 2001. The worldwide Governance indicators are aggregate 
indicators of six broad dimensions of governance namely: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of violence and Terrorism, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption. The six indicators are based on 30 underlying data sources 
reporting the perceptions of a large number of survey respondents and expert 
assessment worldwide.  
Voice and Accountability reflects the perception of the extent to which 
citizens of a given country are able to participate in the selection of their 
government, as well as freedom of association, freedom of expression and 
freedom of Press. Political stability and the absence of violence reflect the 
perception of the likelihood that the current government will be destabilized 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism. Government 
Effectiveness reflects the perception this indicator provides information of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the public service and its 
independence from political pressures and the quality of the formulation and 
the implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment. 
Regulatory Quality reflects the perception of the ability of the government to 
provide sound policies and sound regulations that enable and promote private 
sector development. The Rule of Law reflects the perception of the extent to 
which different agents trust and respect company rules that include the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and courts and the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The control of corruption reflects the extent 
to which the public power is exercised for private purposes. It encompasses 
all forms of corruption, including large and small forms of corruption, as well 
as the capture of the state by the elite and private interests. 
Governance indicators are rated on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with -2.5 
representing institutions of worse quality and 2.5 better institutions. The 
indicators have been transformed so that the transformed indicators take 
values from 1 to 6. The transformed governance indicators are such that low 
values correspond to poor governance and high values correspond to better 
governance.  i  is country fixed effects and it  is the error term. Table 2 below 
shows descriptive statistics.   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
variables  
Number of 
observations 
Mean  Standard 
deviation 
 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP Per Capita 144 3,631,013     5,473,581     166,008    233,47.66 
Gross fixed 
capital formation 
54 33, 855. 47     36.8161   6.405   219.0694 
Secondary school 
enrollment rate 
144 28, 595. 13     14. 296      8. 464   56, 43073 
Population 
 
144 2,730,853      0.545    1,683 3,882,788 
Voice and 
Accountability 
 
144 2.33    0.36    1.52    3.18 
Political Stability 144 2.75   0.77    0.83  4 
Quality of 
Regulation 
 
144 2.51   0.4    1.78    3.64 
Gouvernement 
Effectiveness 
144 2.36     0.36   1.66 3.16 
Rule of Law 
 
144 2.34     0.365   1.66  3.34 
Control of 
Corruption 
144 2.335     0.3564   1. 52    3.18 
Source: WDI (2015), WBGI (2015) and author’s calculus 
 
Over the period of the study (1996-2014), the average GDP per capita 
of the CEMAC zone amounts to US $ 33, 631,013. The standard deviation of 
CEMAC's GDP per capita is US $ 5,473,581. This means that most GDP per 
capita values differ from the average per capita GDP of US $ 5,473,581. The 
lowest GDP per capita of the zone amounts to 166, 008 US dollars while the 
highest is worth 233, 47.66 US dollars. 
At the same time, the lowest indicator of voice and accountability in 
the area is 2.3. Its standard deviation is 0.36. This means that most of the 
values of the voice and accountability indicator of the zone differ from the 
mean of the indicator voice and accountability of 0.36. The lowest level 
reached by this indicator is 1.52 while its best score is 3.18. 
Similarly, the average political stability indicator for the CEMAC zone 
is 2.75. This shows the unstable nature of the political stability of the CEMAC 
zone. Its standard deviation is 0.77. This means that most values of the 
CEMAC indicator of political stability differ from its average of 0.77. Its best 
score is 4.00 when its worst score is 0.83. 
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Table 3 below presents the correlation matrix whose purpose is to measure the degree of correlation between the 
coefficients of the variables. It also shows the degree of linear relationship between the variables. This matrix shows the 
degree of correlation between the independent variables of the model and justifies the empirical relationship between GDP 
per capita and the independent variables. The diagonal of the correlation matrix shows the degree of association between 
a variable and itself. 
The correlation coefficients 0.62 and 0.25 shows a weak positive correlation between political stability, the rule of 
law and GDP per capita. Also, the correlation coefficients -0.41, -0.3, -0.05, -0.17 show a weak and negative link between 
the indicators of voice and accountability, the rule of law, quality of regulation, the government effectiveness, the control 
of corruption, and the gross domestic product per capita. 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 GDP per 
capita 
Physical 
capital 
Human 
capital 
Active 
Population 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Political Stability and 
Absence of violence 
and Terrorism 
Gouvernement 
Effectiveness 
 
Regulatory 
Qualiy 
Rule of 
Law  
Control of 
Corruption 
GDP per capita 1          
Physical capital 0.14 1         
Human capital 0.273 0.020 1        
Active Population 0.066 0.48 -0.020 1       
Voice and 
Accountability 
-0.412 -0.44 0.26 -0.44 1      
Political Stability and 
Absence of violence and 
Terrorism 
0.620 0.311 0.6223 0.44 0.05 1     
Government 
Effectiveness 
-0.167 -0.19 0.45 0.035 0.7 0.41 1    
Regulatory Quality -0.05 -0.43 0.41 -0.04 0.78 0.34 0.78 1   
Rule of Law 0.24 -0.07 0.63 -0.2 0.61 0.68 0.75 0.77 1  
Control of Corruption -0.3 -0.35 0.4 -0.17 0.79 0.1 0.65 0.68 0.65 1 
Source: WDI (2015), WGI (2015) and author’s calculus
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3. Estimation Technique: The Generalized Method of Moments 
Practically, the estimation of our model poses two main problems: 
endogeneity of variables and double causality. To correct these problems, we 
adopt the generalized method of moments with instrumentalization of the 
variables. Indeed, Arrellano and Bond (1991) and Arrellano and Bover (1995) 
constructed unbiased estimators, convergent and asymptotically distributed. 
They show that the problem endogeneity comes either from a strong 
relationship between the dependent variable and some independent variables; 
either of a multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. Blundell and 
Bond (1998) tested this method at using Monte Carlo simulations. These 
authors find that the estimator of generalized moments in system is more 
efficient than that in first difference which exploits only the conditions of the 
moments of the equation in primary difference with delayed variables as 
instruments in level (Arellano & Bond, 1991). To solve the problem of the 
nature of instruments, it makes sense to introduce variables that have nothing 
in common such as institutional or geographic variables (distance) or delay 
some or all of the explanatory variables and test their validity by a test of 
Sargan or Hansen (Roodman, 2009). 
The estimation of the Augmented Islam model by Generalized 
Moment Method in first difference and System is presented in table 4 below. 
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Table 4: Estimation of the Augmented Islam model by GMM in first difference and System 
Dependent Variable: Gross Domestic Product per capita 
 DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS DIF SYS 
GDP per capitat-1  -0. 13*** 
(0.0514)  
-0.04*** 
(0.04) 
-0.193*** 
(0.04) 
-0.077*** 
(0.021) 
 
-0.203*** 
(0.04) 
-0.051*** 
(0.200) 
-0.170*** 
(0.04) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.186*** 
 0.04 
-0.052*** 
(0.02) 
-0.2*** 
(0.041) 
-0.07*** 
(0.22) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.041** 
(0,021) 
Physical Capital  -0.246*** 
(0.081) 
 
-0.02 
0.056 
-0.216*** 
(0.083) 
-0.027 
(0.053) 
-0.196*** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.02 
0.055 
-0.224*** 
(0.086) 
-0.021 
(0.055) 
-0.243*** 
 0.088 
-0.02 
(0.057) 
-0.183** 
(0.803) 
 
-0.002 
(0.05) 
-0.265 
(0.09) 
-0.041 
(0.057) 
Human Capital 0. 031 
(0.010) 
 
0.056 
(0.06) 
0.078 
(0.108) 
0.045 
(0.053) 
0.031 
(0.101) 
0.084 
(0.056) 
 0.04 
(0.103) 
0.065 
(0.635) 
0.0505 
(0.102) 
0.065 
(0.057) 
0.054 
(0.103) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
0,045 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.059) 
Active Population 0.57 
0.544 
 
0.375* 
(0.14) 
 
0.764 
(0.58) 
0.344*** 
(0.132) 
0.4 
(0.51) 
0.34*** 
0.132 
0.375 
(0.538) 
0.366*** 
(0.134) 
0.580 
(0.538) 
0.366*** 
(0.138) 
0.374 
(0.533) 
0.24 
(0.14) 
0.326 
(0.53) 
0.222 
(0.14) 
Voice and Accountability 0.573 
(0.398) 
0.130 
(0.18) 
            
Political Stability   0.196* 
(0.14) 
0.194*** 
0.080 
          
Quality of Regulation 
 
    -0.522 
(0.41) 
-0.072 
0.172 
        
Government Effectiveness       0.337 
(0.34) 
-0.127 
(0.172) 
      
Rule of Law        
 
 0.388 
(0.302) 
0.14 
(0.16) 
    
Control of corruption        
 
   -0.286 
(0.3) 
-0.25 
(0.20) 
  
Constant  -0,19 
(0.22) 
 0.1946 
0.0802 
 -0.005 
(0.203) 
 -0.127 
(0.163) 
 -0.145 
(0.164) 
 0.142 
(0.25) 
 0.074 
(0.2) 
Number of observations 72 78 72 78 72 78 72 78 72 78 76 78 72 78 
AR(1)         
Probability value 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.001) 
AR(2) 
Probability value 
 
 
(0.143) 
 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0,142) 
Sargan's statistics 
Probability of Sargan 
 
65.07 
(0.544) 
152.87 
(0.11) 
64.28 
(0.572) 
147.86 
(0.179) 
67.78 
(0.450) 
155.60 
(0.088) 
66.48 
(0.495) 
151.25 
(0.133) 
68.26 
(0.434) 
154.07 
(0.102) 
67.85 
(0.448) 
152.33 
(0.12) 
66.71 
(0.49) 
153.25 
(0.110) 
               
Implicit Alpha 25.56 19.96 20.41 32.7 19.83 38.06 22.04 40.66 20.87 37.41 19.96 33.63 22.82 40.66 
Convergence speed 
 
2.04 1.61 1.65 2.56 1.6 3 1.77 3.2 1.68 2.95 1.61 2.66 1.83 3.2 
 Notes: *, **, *** represent significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
 Numbers in parentheses represent the standard deviations of the estimated coefficients. 
SYS corresponds to the estimation obtained using System GMM                 DIF corresponds to estimation obtained using first difference GMM 
Source: Author  
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4. Estimation results 
The estimation results are represented in table 4 above. We first 
estimate the model using difference GMM. In the case of the voice and 
accountability model, for example, the coefficient of GDP per capita initially 
delayed by one year is -0.134 and is significant at 1%. This coefficient is 
negative and between -0.13 and -0.23 and is significant at 1% for all models. 
The β-convergence hypothesis is therefore validated for this study period. 
The coefficient of physical capital is negative in all models. But, it is 
significant at 1 % for models with voice and accountability, political stability, 
efficiency of public authorities, regulatory quality and the rule of law. And 
this same coefficient is significant at 5 % for the model with the control of the 
corruption. This result means that physical capital negatively impacts 
economic growth. This can be justified by the low quantity and quality of 
physical capital in the CEMAC zone. 
The coefficient of human capital is positive, but not significant on all 
models. Human capital has no effect on economic growth. This result can be 
justified from the variable chosen to approximate the human capital, namely 
the secondary school enrolment rate. The choice of this variable is imposed by 
the readily available database which is that of the World Bank's development 
indicators. The construction of other proxies of human capital in the CEMAC 
countries may give different results on the relationship between human capital 
and economic growth. 
Then the population coefficient is positive but not significant in all 
models. This result means that the population does not impact growth. 
Most of the coefficients of the institutional variables are positive, but 
not significant. The coefficient of political stability is significant at 10 % and 
is worth 0.196. On the other hand, the coefficients of the models relating to 
the control of the corruption and the quality of the regulation have negative 
coefficients. This result shows that political stability is of paramount 
importance to stimulate economic growth in the CEMAC zone. An 
improvement in the 1% political stability indicator in this zone will lead to a 
growth increase of 0.2 % of economic growth of the CEMAC region.  
Arellano and Bond's first-order autocorrelation test, AR (1), makes it 
possible to reject the first-order negative correlation of residues. For its part, 
the second-order autocorrelation test by Arellano and Bond, AR (2), does not 
make it possible to reject the hypothesis of the absence of second-order 
autocorrelation of the residues. Finally, the Sargan test makes it possible to 
reject the hypothesis of the validity of the lagged variable of GDP per capita 
as an instrument and validates the specified model. 
In order to take into account the potential endogeneity of the GDP per 
capita and the weakness of the instruments due to the estimation by the 
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generalized method of moment in first difference, we apply the estimator of 
the generalized moments in system proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
 The β-convergence hypothesis is validated for the study period for 
models with political stability, quality of regulation, rule of law and control of 
corruption. In the following, the coefficient of physical capital is negative and 
not significant in all models. This result means that physical capital does not 
impact economic growth. The quality and quantity of physical capital does not 
seem sufficient to increase private investment and economic growth in the 
CEMAC countries. 
The coefficient of human capital is positive, but not significant on all 
models. Human capital has no effect on economic growth. This result would 
come from the variable chosen to approximate the human capital, namely the 
secondary school enrolment rate. This indicator is increasingly challenged in 
new work in favour of the number of completed years of study or the quality 
of education. 
The coefficient of population is positive in all models. This is 
significant at 1 % in models with political stability, government effectiveness, 
and control of corruption. This coefficient is significant at 10 % in the model 
with representation and participation. Lastly, it is not significant for the model 
dealing with the control of corruption.  
All the coefficients of the institutional variables are positive except for 
the quality of regulation and control of corruption. Only political stability’s 
coefficient is significant. It is significant at 1 % and is worth 0.2. The other 
coefficients of the institutional variables are not significant. This shows that 
political stability impacts economic growth. Indeed a unit point increase in the 
indicator of political stability in this zone would increase economic growth by 
almost 0.2 percentage points. 
Arellano and Bond's first-order autocorrelation test, AR (1) makes it 
possible to reject the first-order negative correlation of residues. The second-
order autocorrelation test by Arellano and Bond, AR (2) does not reject the 
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation of residues. Finally, the Sargan 
test makes it possible to reject the hypothesis of the validity of the lagged 
variable of GDP per capita as an instrument and validates the specified model. 
These results confirm those obtained by Fabro and Aixalá (2009) for whom 
the coefficient of the aggregate governance indicator is insignificant, but 
positive for countries with very low income per capita. On the other hand, 
these results contradict those of Kilishi et al. (2013) in which the coefficients 
of the quality of regulation and the rule of law are significant and positive. 
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
This study investigates the relationship between institutional quality 
and economic growth using neo-institutional theory and neoclassical theory of 
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growth. Generalized Method of Moment technique is applied on the six 
countries of CEMAC for the period 1996 to 2014. Physical capital and human 
capital are important factors in understanding the growth of the six CEMAC 
countries. There is a positive and significant relationship between political 
stability and economic growth in CEMAC zone. This relationship is more 
significant with system generalized method of moment estimator than first 
difference method moment estimator. The likelihood that an incumbent 
government will be destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including terrorism has positively impacted the economic growth of the area. 
Political instability in CAR and Chad appears to have negatively affected 
economic growth in this area. But, they were politically unstable because of 
low economic viability. Also, the mode of elections of members of the 
executive power, the ability of political parties to win an election or freedom 
of association, freedom of expression and belief have a positive effect on 
economic growth. These results also shows that the measures taken by the 
member countries of the zone to guarantee political stability are beneficial for 
the economic growth of the CEMAC zone. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Description of variables and data sources 
Variables Definition  Sources  
GDP per capita The actual GDP per capita in US dollars obtained by 
deflating the nominal GDP for all countries. 
WDI (2015) 
Active population Population ages 15-64, total WDI (2015) 
Physical capital Gross capital formation (constant 2010 US$) WDI (2015) 
Human Capital School enrolment, secondary (% gross). This is the ratio of 
the total enrolment, regardless of age, and the population of 
the age group that officially corresponds to the level of 
secondary education. 
WDI (2015) 
Voice and 
Accountability  
It reflects the perception of the extent to which citizens of a 
given country are able to participate in the selection of their 
government, as well as freedom of association, freedom of 
expression and freedom of Press. 
WGI (2015) 
Political Stability and 
Absence of violence 
and Terrorism 
It is the perception of the likelihood that the current 
government will be destabilized by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including terrorism. 
WGI (2015) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
It reflects the perception this indicator provides information of 
the quality of public services, the quality of the public service 
and its independence from political pressures and the quality 
of the formulation and the implementation and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment. 
WGI (2015) 
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Regulatory Quality It reflects the perception of the ability of the government to 
provide sound policies and sound regulations that enable and 
promote private sector development 
WGI (2015) 
Rule of Law It reflects the perception of the extent to which different agents 
trust and respect company rules that include the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police and courts 
and the likelihood of crime and violence. 
WGI (2015) 
Control of Corruption It reflects the extent to which the public power is exercised for 
private purposes. It encompasses all forms of corruption, 
including large and small forms of corruption, as well as the 
capture of the state by the elite and private interests. 
 
WGI (2015) 
Source: Author 
